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This paper examines the Aghion and Howitt [1992] “creative destruction” endogenous 
growth model in an open economy setting.  We consider four alternative trade regimes. 
The first two regimes allow the monopoly producer of the intermediate good to attain 
worldwide monopoly rents. In the first of the two, the countries engage in trade of only 
the imperfectly produced intermediate good. In the second, the two countries trade in 
both the intermediate good as well as in ideas. The last two regimes consider two 
countries which are identical before and after trade opens such that pro-competitive gains 
from trade are achieved. We again consider when only intermediaries may be traded and 
thereafter when both intermediaries and ideas may be traded. We find that the effects of 
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1. Introduction 
The goal of new growth theory is to shed light on the nature of long run growth in 
per capita income.  Irrespective of which model one chooses to employ as the framework 
for analysis of growth, the Ramsey (1928) model, it’s more modern Lucas (1988) version, 
or the Diamond (1965) model, the underlying result is the same.  When technological 
advances are assumed to be exogenous, long run per capita income growth can only 
result from increasing productivity of labor.  In other words, GDP per capita can only 
grow in the long run as a result of continuous technological change. As a consequence of 
this theoretical regularity, several authors have considered the nature of technology and 
it’s evolution. 
Two influential papers in New Growth Theory are Romer (1990) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992).  They are similar in that they both consider technological change to be the 
result of researchers whose incentive it is to capture monopoly rents from their 
inventions.  Research firms in Romer (1990) add to the level of technology through 
successive innovations. The firms combine human capital effort with the existing stock of 
knowledge to move technology forward one innovation at a time. The new innovation 
enters the production process through the incumbent firm who shifts its efforts from 
research to monopoly production of the newest intermediate input. Final goods 
production combines the latest intermediate good and work effort. The only input needed 
to produce the latest intermediate good is the one that immediately preceded it. Once a 
researcher comes up with an innovation, he owns monopoly rights over it’s production 
for ever after. Furthermore, there always exists a market for every patent, however many 
generations back from the most current innovation it was introduced, since each   6
successive innovation becomes an intermediate good whose production requires its 
predecessor. There ultimately develops a continuum of intermediate goods, each 
absolutely necessary to its successor, that lead up to final goods, which of course requires 
the latest intermediary. 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) also consider patent exploitation as the incentive to 
conduct research. The fundamental difference in their model is that the production of 
each new improved intermediate good requires only work effort. Therefore, since final 
goods production still depends on the most current intermediate good, the latest 
intermediary replaces its predecessor. Hence, technological change is the result of 
continuous obsolescence or “creative destruction.” Research firms compete to introduce 
the latest innovation at which time they cease researching and concentrate on production 
and consequently on profits. Unlike Romer (1990), the patents only last until the next 
innovation renders the current one obsolete. Although technological advances occur 
randomly, they do so with a discernable Poisson arrival rate. Thus on average, one may 
consider the likelihood of a technological advance within a given span of time.  
Extensions of the above two seminal papers are numerous and cover many of the 
stylized facts that we observe in the world. Of particular interest here are the implications 
of international trade on technological change. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) consider 
the open economy version of Romer (1990). Therein, they consider two economies that 
may trade in the imperfectly produced intermediate good as well as trade in ideas.  Their 
incumbent innovator may capture monopoly rents in both the home and foreign markets. 
An interesting facet of their paper is that although they assume that the two countries are 
identical while in autarky, the countries cease to be so with integration. As a result, the   7
two countries take turns innovating. This issue was first noted by Devereux and Lapham 
(1994).  They find that if either country differs even slightly in size, relative research 
effort would favor the larger country. At the limit, the larger country through faster 
growth does all of the research for the whole world. In Barreto and Kobayashi (2001), we 
consider the implications of the two countries remaining identical even after integration. 
Our findings parallel the standard trade literature results of pro-competitive gains from 
trade between countries where one or more of the traded goods are imperfectly produced. 
Thus, we find that imperfect competition is a sufficient determinant of trade even 
between otherwise identical countries.  Other papers that have considered various aspects 
of Schumpeterian growth in an open economy include Verspagan and Wakelin (1997), 
Dinoupoulos and Syropoulos (1997), and Dinoupoulos and Segerstrom (1999). 
In the following paper, we consider both assumptions. Section 2 reviews the basic 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) model in a closed economy setting to serve as a benchmaark. 
Section 3 considers economic integration of two countries using their framework. Sub-
sections 3.1 and 3.2 consider, as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), the availability of 
worldwide monopoly rents, first when only intermediaries may be traded and then when 
both intermediaries as well as ideas may be traded. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 consider, as in 
Barreto and Kobayashi (2001), the pro-competitive gains from trade that result from a 
duopoly after integration. Again, we consider first, if only intermediate goods may be 
traded and second, if intermediate goods as well as ideas may be traded. Section 4 
compares the results across the four possible cases. Section 5 presents some conclusions. 
 
2. Closed Economy   8
The following is a summary of the Schumpeterian approach to endogenous 
technological change introduced by Aghion and Howitt (1992). Throughout this section, 
we assume autarky within each country.  
The economy consists of three sectors: a final goods sector, an intermediate goods 








− = ∫  (0.1) 
Only the final good,  y , can only be consumed and it is subject to the discount rate, r .  It 
is produced using only the most recent version of the intermediate goods, x, according to 
the following production function. 
  yA x
α =  (0.2) 
This is the essence of the technological change resulting from obsolescence. Firms 
compete across time to produce an ever-improving intermediate good.  When a firm 
develops a successful innovation, it is rewarded with monopoly profits derived from the 
sale of its version of  t x to the final goods producer of  t y . 
The aggregate flow of labor supply, L , has two competing uses, intermediate goods 
production and research. Intermediate firms employ a simple one for one linear 
production function such that x is also the amount of labor used in producing 
intermediate goods. The development of new innovations is also a result of a simple 
linear technology such that n is the amount of labor used in research.  Hence the labor-
market clearing condition is 
  L nx =+  (0.3)   9
The level of technology, t A , increases through successive innovations,t, that make 
its initial level, 0 A , ever more productive.  Each new innovation raises productivity of  A 
by a factor of γ  such that 
  0 1
t
t AA γγ =>  (0.4) 
Innovations arrive randomly with a Poisson arrival rate of  () n λ ⋅Φ , where () n Φ  is 
a constant returns to scale function of research effort, n, and  0 λ >  is the productivity 
parameter of research technology. 
  () nn λλ Φ=  (0.5) 
The profit function associated with a new innovation is 
  1
RD
tt t n t nV wn λ + Π= −  (0.6) 
where  1 t V +  is the discounted expected payoff to the( 1)
th t + innovation from research 




















Therefore, the research firm’s first order condition may then be expressed as a function of 
























The profit function faced by final goods producers and its consequent first order 
condition are defined as follows. 
 
y
t t xt tt xt yp xA x p x
α Π= − = −  (0.9)   
 
1
xt t pA x
α α
− =  (0.10)   10
The profit function faced by an intermediary and its consequent first order condition 
are defined as follows.  
 
x
tx t x t t tx t p xw x A x w x
α α Π= − = −  (0.11) 
 
21 *xt t wA x
α α
− ≥  (0.12) 





































Therefore, the monopoly profits to the intermediary for the most recent innovation may 







 Π= − 

 (0.15) 
The labor market is competitive so that  * * xn ww =  and the labor market clearing 




















Accordingly, the research labor input,n∗ , which satisfies equation (0.16) may be 




















It is important to note that the interest rate,r , which is defined as the marginal product of 






− =  (0.18) 







order to do so, consider first the flow of final output,  t y , between two successive 
innovations, t and () 1 t + . The level of output, for any given innovation, is defined simply 
as 
  () tt t t t yA x A L n
α α ==−  (0.19) 
Technology changes at the fixed rate per innovation equal to γ . Therefore, the 
relationship of output between consecutive innovations is defined as 
  1 tt yy γ + =  (0.20) 
We may then interpret the log of equation (0.20) to imply that the real time output level, 
yτ , increases by () lnγ  with each new innovation. The real time growth of output is 
determined by the number of innovations between period τ and () 1 τ + . Therefore 
  () 1 ln ln ln yy τ ττ γε + =+  (0.21) 
where  τ ε  equals the number of innovations between period τ and  () 1 τ +  and is 
distributed randomly with a Poisson arrival rate of  t n λ . Simple substitution yields that   12
the average growth rate of output is defined as follows. 










3. Open Economy 
In the closed economy, the intermediary solely owns and therefore exploits the 
leading-edge technology as a monopolist.  However, once trade opens, the effects on the 
welfare and the growth rate of the economies in question depend critically upon the 
assumption that one adopts covering the nature of the two economies and their 
subsequent trade. One may either assume that trade allows each innovating firm to garner 
worldwide monopoly rents or that each country has its own imperfectly competitive 
intermediary that produces a perfect substitute for it foreign counterpart. Trade under the 
latter assumption results in cross border duopolistic competition and pro-competitive 
gains from trade. 
Trade in which the intermediate firm establishes a worldwide monopoly over its 
innovation is described in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). Therein, they consider 
knowledge driven endogenous technological change, as is described in Romer (1990), 
where trade in intermediate goods without trade in ideas has no growth or welfare effects 
whatsoever. Their premise is intuitively simple. If the intermediate goods market is 
defined by imperfect competition, and the uniqueness of innovations extends worldwide, 
trade in a two-country model exactly doubles the size of the market faced by incumbent 
innovators. But since the incumbent innovator, whether home or foreign, faces twice the 
competition from both home and foreign R&D firms, the larger market is only available 
for half the time. One effect cancels the other such that trade in goods without trade in   13
ideas has no net growth or welfare effects. Once trade in ideas is allowed, in addition to 
trade in intermediate goods, both positive welfare and growth effects result. 
Alternatively, if one considers two identical countries in autarky and then maintains 
that they are still identical even after economic integration, trade in goods without trade 
in ideas results in pro-competitive gains. The result is intuitively similar to that which is 
found in the trade literature on imperfect competition as a determinant to trade between 
identical countries.
1 When two identical countries trade and the traded good is produced 
by local monopolies, the result is a duopoly where the two imperfect competitors share 
the worldwide market. This alternative, again using the Romer (1990) framework, is 
explored by Barreto and Kobayashi (2001). We find that trade in goods without trade in 
ideas has a negative growth effect but a positive welfare effect. Furthermore, once trade 
in ideas is also allowed, we show that the growth benefits of trade in ideas outweigh the 
negative growth effects of the pro-competitive gains from trade in intermediate goods. 
There are analytic strengths as well as weaknesses to either lines of reasoning.
2  The 
main strength of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) relates to the concept a worldwide 
monopoly as the incentive to innovate. The main weakness therein is the stepwise nature 
of trade where each country is forced to take turns innovating.  The main strength of 
Barreto and Kobayashi (2001) is the pro-competitive gains result and its relation to the 
trade literature.  The main weakness in our paper is that even without trade in ideas, each 
country comes up with identical competing innovations. 
In the following analysis of economic integration in a Schumpeterian growth model, 
we consider both assumptions.  Sections 3.1 and 3.2 consider trade in both intermediate 
goods and ideas under the same assumptions as Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). Sections   14
3.3 and 3.4 consider trade in both intermediate goods and ideas under the same 
assumptions as Barreto and Kobayashi (2001). 
 
3.1 Trade in Intermediate goods ()
HF x x ≠  
Suppose that there are two monopolists, one per country, producing  t x  at any given 
innovation,t.   Let
F x be the foreign intermediate goods and 
H x  be the home intermediate 
good.   Assume that the two countries are identical only until the time of integration. 
Once trade commences, the countries become differentiated such that 
HF x x ≠ and each 
incumbent intermediate good producer can garner monopoly rents across the entire 
world.
3  
Each country produces final goods according to the following production function. 
 (  o r   )
HF yf x x A x
α ==  (1.1) 
Thus output, at any given time, is a function of the most current innovation. That 
innovation may originate from home or abroad. As before, the interest rate and in the 





− =  (1.2) 
The profit function faced by final goods producers and its consequent first order 
condition are the same as before. 
 
y
tt x tt tx t yp xA x p x
α Π= − = −  (1.3) 
 
1
xt t p Ax
α α
− =  (1.4) 
Note that  x p  is the monopoly price of the latest innovation,  t x , as determined by the   15
incumbent intermediate producer who may be foreign or domestic. 
The monopolist intermediate goods producer, whether home or foreign, maximizes 
the following profit function and yields the subsequent first order conditions. 
  () () 22
x
tx t x t p xwx Π= −  (1.5) 
 
21 *xt t wA x
α α






















 Π= − 

 (1.8) 
The profit function faced by each R&D firm, whether home or foreign, is defined as 
  1
RD
tt t n t nV wn λ + Π= −  (1.9) 
The effect of the larger market again enters the system analytically through the  1 t V +  term, 
which is defined as the discounted expected payoff to the( 1)
th t + innovation from research 




























































The competitive labor market where  * * xn ww = , yields the market clearing 









































Notice that equation (1.13) is identical to equation (0.17). The optimal allocation of work 
effort toward research is the same under autarky as it is under trade in intermediate 
goods. Therefore, the consequent growth rates of output under the two regimes must also 
be equal. 










3.2 Trade in Intermediate goods and Ideas ()
HF x x ≠  
Once again we assume, that both countries are not identical upon integration. Only 
now, in addition to trade in intermediate goods, the countries may also trade ideas. This 
concept is modeled by allowing the two countries to share in each others’ research efforts 
such that for each country, 2
FH nn n =+ . 
As before, each country produces final goods using the most current innovation, 
irrespective of whether that innovation originates at home or abroad. Therefore, the final 
goods firm’s profit function is identical to that found in section 3.1. Furthermore, the 
intermediary monopolist’s profit function is also identical to that from the previous   17
section. For the sake of continuity, those equations are reproduced here in summary. 
 
y
tt x tt tx t yp xA x p x
α Π= − = −  (2.1) 
 
1
xt t pA x
α α
− =  (2.2) 
  () () 22 22
x
tx t x t t t x t p xwx A x w x
α α Π= − = −  (2.3) 
 
21 *xt t wA x
α α





















 Π= − 

 (2.6) 
As mentioned earlier, trade in ideas takes the form of countries sharing their research 
effort with one another. Although each country’s R&D firm benefits from the other’s 
efforts, each need only pay its own employees. The profit function faced by R&D firm 
therefore takes the following form. 
  () 1
RD H F
tt t t n t nn Vw n λ + Π= + −  (2.7) 
1 t V + , again defined as the discounted expected payoff to the( 1)
th t + innovation from 

















































































Accordingly, the optimal labor input,  * n , for R&D which satisfies this (2.10) may be 




















Intuitively, once trade in ideas is introduced in addition to trade in intermediate 
goods, the period between innovations should be shorter. In other words, one would 
expect that through cooperation in research, one country’s R&D firm can catch up and, 
using the foreign competitor’s idea, improve upon the product in question. The analytic 
solution for the growth rate of income demonstrates this idea. 










3.3 Trade in Intermediate goods ()
HF x x =  
In this section and the next, we consider the case where the two countries are 
absolutely identical in autarky as well as in trade. This mode of analysis parallels the 
standard trade literature’s approach to imperfect competition as a determinant of trade. As 
in that line of research, imperfect competition in one or more traded goods leads to pro-
competitive gains from trade between otherwise identical countries.  
Suppose again that there are two monopolists, one per country, producing t x  at any   19
given innovation, t. Since they are completely identical, each monopolist produces a 
version of the most current innovation. The two versions are perfect substitute for one 
another. Once trade in intermediate goods is allowed, the final goods producer in each 
country effectively faces a duopoly. Just as in the trade literature, it is the ability of the 
final goods producer to buy from abroad that changes the market structure of 
intermediate goods from monopoly to duopoly. Actual trade in intermediate goods does 
not occur since there is no need. The firm’s production function therefore takes the 
following form. 
  ()
HF yA x x
α
=+  (3.1) 
As a result of the new market structure, the interest rate, defined as the marginal product 







=  (3.2) 
The final goods producer’s profit function and its consequent first order condition are 
then defined as 
  () () () 22
yH F
tt x tt t t x t yp x x Ax px
α
Π= − + = −  (3.3) 
  ()
1




=  (3.4) 
The profit function faced by duopolist is analytically similar to autarky but the 




tx t x t t tx t px wx Ax wx
αα α
− Π= − = −  (3.5) 
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α α − 
= 

 (3.7)   20







 Π= − 

 (3.8) 
As in section 3.1, the profit function faced by R&D sector is defined as follows. 
  1
RD
tt t n t nV wn λ + Π= −  (3.9) 
where  1 t V +  is the discounted expected payoff to the( 1)
th t + innovation from research 

































































































Notice that the analytic solution to the optimal research effort, equation (3.13), is similar 
in construction to that from autarky, equation (0.17).  But, it is important to note they are 
indeed different because of the interest rate under duopoly, equation (3.2), is not the same   21
as the interest rate under autarky, equation (0.18). As a result, although analytically 
similar to autarky, the average growth rate of income also differs with trade. 










3.4 Trade in Intermediate goods and Ideas ()
HF x x =  
We  again  assume  that  both countries are absolutely identical before and after 
integration. Similar to the changes from sections 3.1 to 3.2, here we modify section 3.3 to 
allow trade in ideas in addition to trade in intermediate goods. Again, this concept is 
modeled by allowing both countries R&D firms to share in each other’s research effort 
such that 2
FH nn n =+ . 
The final good producer’s profit function, the intermediary’s producer’s profit 
functions and consequent first order conditions are the same as in section 3.3. We 
reproduce them here to maintain the paper’s continuity. 
  ()
HF yA x x
α







=  (4.2) 
  () () () 22
yH F
tt x tt t t x t yp x x Ax px
α
Π= − + = −  (4.3) 
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1








tx t x t t tx t px wx Ax wx
αα α
− Π= − = −  (4.5) 
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 Π= − 

 (4.8) 
The R&D firm in each country now faces a profit function that must account for the 
benefits of the added research productivity. 
  () 1
RD H F
tt t t n t nn Vw n λ + Π= + −  (4.9) 















































































Accordingly, the analytic solution for the optimal labor input to the R&D firm which 




















And the average growth rate of income is defined as   23









Little can be said from simple inspection of the analytic solution for n* or  * g .  
Fortunately though, careful analysis conducted in the next section, reveals that all four 
cases are comparable such that firm conclusions may be drawn about the effects of trade 
in goods and in ideas on growth and welfare when endogenous technological change is 
defined by creative destruction. 
 
4. Comparisons 
The following analysis considers the effects of free trade on growth rates and 
welfare. We compare the results of section (3.1) through (3.4). Table 1 summarizes the 
results from autarky and the four cases. Note that case (3.1) is exactly the same as the 
autarky. As mentioned before, the intuition behind this result is simple. The intermediary 
monopolist in the case (3.1) produces twice as much  x as the intermediary monopolist in 
autarky but for a half the time. Thus trade in intermediate goods without trade in ideas 
has no growth or welfare effects whatsoever. Henceforth, we will not mention case (3.1) 
but instead consider only autarky as the benchmark. 
To determine trade’s effect on average growth rates of output, we need to compare 
not only the labor efforts across cases, but also all of the various components that directly 
and indirectly determine the average growth rate. The following presents mostly intuitive 
explanations for the relationships across the cases. Appendix 2 contains the analytic 
proofs that coincide with the following results. 
First, compare the optimal relative research efforts in each of the four cases.  The 
results may be summarized as follows.   24
3.2 3.4 3.3 *** * AUT nnn n >> >  
When trade in ideas allowed, as in cases (3.2) and (3.4), the efficiency of research labor 
effectively doubles in both countries.  With higher marginal products of research effort, 
both  3.2 * n  and  3.4 * n  are higher than autarky research effort,  *AUT n . Since the monopolist 
in the case (3.2) enjoys higher profits than the duopolist in the case (3.4), the incumbent 
researcher in case (3.2) has that more to gain from being the next innovator. The greater 
incentive is reflected by more research effort, thus  3.2 3.4 ** nn > .  The R&D firm in case 
(3.3) has the least to gain as a duopolist without the benefit of shared research.  His 
research is the least productive of all and consequently he has the lowest relative research 
effort. 
Second, consider the relative employment by the intermediaries. Recall that since the 
labor markets are competitive, i.e. L nx =+ , the following results must mirror those from 
the employment by the research firms.  
3.2 3.4 3.3 *** * AUT x xx x << <  
3.2 3.4 ** x x <  and  3.3 ** AUT x x <  are easily justified as the pro-competitive gains from 
trade results. As the market structure shifts from monopoly to duopoly, output of x 
increases. The fact that  3.4 ** AUT xx <  implies that the positive wealth effect in terms of 
research from trade in ideas is relatively greater than the negative substitution effect from 
trade in intermediate goods.  
Third, compare the intermediate good prices that are set by the various imperfect 
competitors. 
3.2 3.4 3.3 AUT p pp p >> >    25
Diagrams 1 through 8 compare the various price and quantities set by the imperfect 
competitors under the differing regimes. In Diagram 5, the international monopolist 
which also enjoys the benefits of trade in ideas, sets his price,  3.2 p , higher and his 
quantity lower than the autarky monopolist. Thus the productivity benefits of trade in 
ideas, reflected in the marginal cost to the monopolist, outweigh the effects of reduced 
demand for intermediate goods. In Diagram 2, which compares the duopolist that enjoys 
the benefits of trade in ideas to autarky, the opposite is the case.  Although the researchers 
in cases (3.4) gain productivity from shared ideas, those benefits are outweighed by the 
fall in demand for intermediate goods such that  3.4 AUT p p >  and  3.4 AUT x x > . Diagram 3 
compares the two duopoly cases (3.3) and (3.4). Since the pro-competitive gains from 
trade affect both regimes equivalently, the net difference between the two is the trade in 
ideas in case (3.4). Thus  3.4 3.3 p p >  and  3.4 3.3 x x < . Diagram 8 summarizes all of the 
results. Notice that cases (3.2) and (3.4) share the same demand curve. This is because 
the only difference is the market structure faced by the imperfect competitor, which is 
reflected by movement along the curve.  The same can be said of case (3.1) versus 
autarky. 
The interest rate, r , is defined as the marginal product of intermediate goods, x, in 
the production of final goods.    
{ } 3.4 3.2 3.3 , AUT rr rr >>  
Trade in intermediate goods, a staple in all four cases, leads to an increase in the demand 
for those goods, therefore the autarky marginal product of x and consequently the interest 
rate,  AUT r , must be less than all of the others. The addition of trade in ideas will increase 
the productivity of labor and accordingly the marginal product of intermediate goods,   26
thus  3.4 3.3 rr > .  Furthermore, the marginal product of x is greater under duopoly than 
under monopoly, thus  3.4 3.2 rr > .  Intuitively, consider one firm that takes care of a large 
market versus two firms that share that same market. The lower relative production of the 
individual duopolist implies a higher marginal product than the high relative production 
and low marginal product of the monopolist. It is not clear which is higher,  3.2 r  or  3.3 r .
4 
The results for the growth rates of per capita income are summarized as follows. 
3.2 3.4 3.3 *** * AUT ggg g >> >  
Growth rates ultimately reflect labor effort in research which in turn ultimately reflects 
incentives. Case (3.2) provides R&D firms the greatest incentive and consequently results 
in the highest growth rate. Case (3.3) provides the least incentive and growth suffers 
accordingly. Purely as a result of pro-competitive gains from trade,  3.3 ** AUT gg > . In 
other words, trade in imperfectly produced intermediate goods without trade in ideas 
between two identical countries results in less research effort due to the reduced 
incentives under duopoly versus under monopoly. Whereas,  3.2 3.4 *** AUT ggg >>  
because the countries devote more effort toward research as the R&D sector becomes 
more competitive as well as more effective. Therefore, the greater are the incentives to 
the research firm, i.e. monopoly versus duopoly, the more creative destruction takes 
place, and the higher is the rate of technological advance which ultimately drives the long 
run growth in per capita income. 
  A final point to consider is the levels of welfare of the home and foreign 
representative agents at any given time across the four cases. This is a difficult 
comparison to make because in the long run, the economy with the highest growth rate 
must eventually be the best off. At best, one can comment loosely about the transition   27
from autarky to trade given each scenario. For example, assuming the same initial 
conditions, at the point at which trade opens, agents are better off in case (3.4) than (3.2) 
because the initial effect on welfare would have to be greater since  3.4 3.2 x x >  and 
3.4 3.2 p p < . But given enough time, whatever discreet pro-competitive gain from trade in 
welfare were accrued from agents under case (3.4) would eventually be insignificant 
given the higher growth rate of technology in case (3.2). 
 
5. Conclusions 
The growth rate of income per capita is positively correlated with the incentives 
available to the respective R&D firms. There is no way to escape this simple fact. 
Irrespective of what drives technological change, whether it is knowledge driven as 
suggested by Romer (1990) or obsolescence driven as suggested by Aghion and Howitt 
(1992), or which methodology one assumes that trade is based upon, international 
monopolies as suggested by Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) or international oligopolies 
as suggested by Barreto Kobayashi (2001), the greater is the return to research, the more 
of it is conducted, and the faster technology will develop. 
The cursory result of this therefore suggests that in the long run, monopolies are 
superior to competition due to the incentive to conduct research is greater. This may well 
be true in the long run, although it is not necessarily true for any time interval less than 
the long run. Herein we have presented the theoretical results of trade given a certain set 
of rules for its evolution. We have in no way quantified the results. Therefore, it is 
possible that the pro-competitive gains from trade may be so great that the short to 
medium term welfare benefits as well as the distributional elements of greater   28
competition may outweigh the long run growth considerations associated purely with 
incentives. 
As a to the new growth literature, we add significantly. First, we develop a more 
simple and elegant way to consider trade between countries when growth is defined by 
“creative destruction.”  Second, we show that irrespective of how technology evolves, it 
is the incentive structure to the R&D firm that has the crucial impact on growth rates. 
Third, we add to the trade literature by comprehensively comparing the effects of two 
distinct incentive structures in the context of endogenous growth and economic 
integration.  
The possible extensions of this paper are numerous. Any change in the incentive 
available to the research firm will affect growth. An obvious extension is to consider 
barriers to trade. Another extension along public choice lines is to consider the imposition 
of taxes. One could consider an income tax on final production versus a value added tax 
on intermediaries as well as final production. And lastly, an interesting exercise given the 
framework presented here would be to consider differentiated countries, whether in size, 
market organization, base technological level.   29
Appendix 1 – Welfare analysis of laissez-faire versus social optimum levels of 
research 
 
To understand the implications on welfare of trade when obsolescence motivates 
technological change, consider a social planner’s problem when she attempts to 
maximize the expected present value of consumption, yτ . 
The social planner’s problem under autarky, which exactly the same as case (3.1), is 















 ∑ ∫∫  (5.1) 
where  () , t τ Π is the probability of t innovations up to time τ . The innovations process is 
Poisson with an arrival rate of  n λ , therefore 









− Π=  (5.2) 
The social planner must consider both technological change and the labor market 
equilibrium. 
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The utility function can therefore be rewritten as  













The socially optimal level of research, 
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Hence, the socially optimal level of research, 2






















In case (3.2), expected welfare is  
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 ∑ ∫∫  (5.8) 
where  () , t τ Π is modified as follows. 











Π=  (5.9) 
Therefore the utility function can be rewritten as    30













And the socially optimal level of research, 3.2






















In case (3.3), expected welfare function is changed to  
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== Π + 
 ∑ ∫∫  (5.12) 
where  () , t τ Π is again defined as it was under autarky. 









− Π=  (5.13) 
The utility function and its consequent social optimal level of research,  3.3
S n , can be 
expressed as follows. 


































Lastly, in the case (3.4), expected welfare is   
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== Π + 
 ∑ ∫∫  (5.16) 
where  () , t τ Π is defined as follows. 











Π=  (5.17) 
and the utility function and its consequent social optimal level of research,  3.4
S n , are 


































The parallels between the competitive optimum levels of work effort and their 
corresponding social optimum levels make the comparisons across the four cases straight   31
forward. The three effects of obsolescence, appropriability, business stealing, and 
intertemporal spillovers, that differentiate the social optimum from the laissez faire 
equilibrium depend solely on the parameters.  For example, the business stealing effect is 
result of the relative size of innovations, γ . The larger the innovations, the more 
incentive for firms to research and the greater will be the laissez-faire growth rate. The 
appropriability effect depends on α , where the closer α  is to one, the less the 
monopolist can appropriate the whole output flow and resulting less research than is 
socially optimal.  Irrespective, since the parameters are the same across cases, the results 
are as well.  If the social optimum level of research is greater than the laissez faire-level, 
then it will be greater in the open economy setting as well.   32
Appendix 2 – Technical Summary of Comparisons of Laissez Faire Analytic 
Equilibriums 
 
Summary Results of Comparisons 
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where   3.2 ** AUT nn >   if   3.2 2 AUT rr <  
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Note :  It is not clear which is higher,  3.2 r  or  3.3 r . 
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Table 1 
Autarky                                           3.1 Trade in                                 3.2 Trade in               
                                                               Intermediaries                             Intermediaries +   
                                                               ( )
HF x x ≠                                   Ideas ()
























































AUT t t pA x
α α
− =                              
1
3.1 tt pA x
α α
− =                            
1
3.2 tt pA x
α α
− =  
21
AUT t t wA x
α α
− =                            
21
3.1 tt wA x
α α
− =                           
21
3.2 tt wA x
α α
























































































































** ln AUT AUT gn λ γ =                       ()
**
3.1 3.1 ln gn λ γ =                        ()
**
3.2 3.2 2l n gn λ γ =  
 
3.3 Trade in                                  3.4 Trade in               
      Intermediaries                               Intermediaries +   
     ( )
HF x x =                                      Ideas ()







































3.3 2 tt pA x
α α
− =                         ()
1
3.4 2 tt pA x
α α
− =  
()
1 2
3.3 2 tt wA x
α α
− =                        ()
1 2
3.4 2 tt wA x
α α





































3.3 22 rA x
α α
− =                             ()
1
3.4 22 rA x
α α











































3.3 3.3 ln gn λ γ =                             ()
**
3.4 3.4 2l n gn λ γ =    46
Bibliography 
 
Aghion, Phillipe and Peter Howitt (1992), “A model of growth through creative 
destruction,” Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 2, 323-351. 
 
Barreto, Raul A. and Kaori Kobayashi (2001), “Economic integration and endogenous 
growth revisited: Pro-competitive gains from trade in goods and the long run benefits to 
the exchange of ideas,” Adelaide University Working Paper Series, No. 01-12. 
 
Devereuw, M. B. and B.J. Lapham (1994), “The stability of integration and endogenous 
growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, p. 299-395. 
 
Diamond, Peter A. (1965), “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model”, American 
Economic Review, 55, 1126-1150. 
 
Lucas, Robert E. (1988), “On the mechanics of economic development” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 22, p. 3-42. 
 
Ramsey, F. P. (1928), “A mathematical theory of Saving,” Economic Journal, 38, 
December, p. 543-559. 
 
Rivera-Batiz, Luis A. and Paul M. Romer (1991), “Economic Integration and 
Endogenous Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 530-555. 
 
Romer, Paul M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, S71-S102.
                                                           
ENDNOTES 
1For example, see Markusen, et.al. (1995), chapter 11 or any other intermediate to graduate level 
international trade textbook for a complete description imperfect competition as a determinant of trade 
between identical countries. 
2 See Barreto and Kobayashi (2001) for a complete discussion of the pros and cons. 
3 See Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) for a thorough discussion of this assumption. 
44 See appendix 2 for details. CIES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
The CIES Discussion Paper series provides a means of circulating promptly papers of 
interest to the research and policy communities and written by staff and visitors 
associated with the Centre for International Economic Studies (CIES) at the Adelaide 
University. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion of issues of contemporary policy 
relevance among non-economists as well as economists. To that end the papers are 
non-technical in nature and more widely accessible than papers published in specialist 
academic journals and books. (Prior to April 1999 this was called the CIES Policy 
Discussion Paper series. Since then the former CIES Seminar Paper series has been 
merged with this series.) 
 
Copies of CIES Policy Discussion Papers may be downloaded from our Web site at 
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/ or are available by contacting the Executive Assistant, 
CIES, School of Economics, Adelaide University, SA 5005 AUSTRALIA. Tel: (+61 8) 
8303 5672, Fax: (+61 8) 8223 1460, Email: cies@adelaide.edu.au. Single copies are 
free on request; the cost to institutions is US$5.00 overseas or A$5.50 (incl. GST) in 
Australia each including postage and handling. 
 
For a full list of CIES publications, visit our Web site at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/ 
or write, email or fax to the above address for our List of Publications by CIES 
Researchers, 1989 to 1999 plus updates. 
 
0317  Barreto, Raul A. and Kaori Kobayashi,  
0316  Barreto, Raul A. and Kaori Kobayashi, “Open Economy Schumpeterian Growth”, May 
2003. 
0315  Wilson, Patrick J. and Ralf Zurbruegg, “Trends and Spectral Response:  An 
Examination of the US Realty Market”, May 2003. 
0314  Esho, Neil and Anatoly Kirievsky, Damian Ward and Ralf Zurbruegg, “Law and the 
Demand for Property-Casualty Insurance Consumption”, May 2003. (Forthcoming in 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2003). 
0313  Wilson, Patrick J. and Ralf Zurbruegg, “Does it Pay to Diversify Real Estate Assets? - 
A Literary Perspective”, May 2003. 
0312  Rajan, Ramkishen, “Taxing International Currency Flows: A Financial Safeguard or 
Financial Bonanza?”, April 2003. 
0311  Rajan, Ramkishen, “Financial Crisis, Capital Outflows and Policy Responses: Simple 
Analytics and Examples from East Asia”, April 2003. 
0310  Cavoli, Tony and Ramkishen Rajan, “Exchange Rate Arrangements for East Asia 
Post-Crisis: Examining the Case for Open Economy Inflation Targeting”, April 2003. 
0309  Cavoli, Tony and Ramkishen Rajan, “Designing Appropriate Exchange Rate Regimes 
for East Asia: Inflation Targeting and Monetary Policy Rules”, April 2003. 
0308  Allsopp, Louise, “Speculative Behaviour, Debt Default and Contagion: An Explanation 
of the Latin American Crisis 2001-2002”, March 2003. 
0307  Barreto, Raul. A., A Model of State Infrastructure with Decentralized Public Agents: 
Theory and Evidence, March 2003. 
0306  Pardey, Philip G., Julian M. Alston, Connie Chan-Kang, Eduardo C. Magalhães, and 
Stephen A. Vosti, “Assessing and Attributing the Benefits from Varietal Improvement 
Research: Evidence from Embrapa, Brazil”, March 2003. 
0305  Allsopp, Louise, “Venezuela: A Nation In Need of Reform”, March 2003.   49
0304  Allsopp, Louise and Ralf Zurbruegg, “Purchasing Power Parity in East Asia: Why all 
the Fuss?”, March 2003. 
0303  Allsopp, Louise and Ralf Zurbruegg, “Purchasing Power Parity and the Impact of the 
East Asian Currency Crisis”, March 2003. 
0302  Siregar, Reza and Ramkishen Rajan, “Exchange Rate Policy and Foreign Exchange 
Reserves Management in Indonesia in the Context of East Asian Monetary 
Regionalism”, March 2003. 
0301  Jackson, Lee Ann, “Protectionist Harmonization of Food Safety Policies in the Asia-
Pacific Region”, January 2003. 
0236  Damania, Richard, “Protectionist Lobbying and Strategic Investment”, November 2002 
0235  Damania, Richard and John Hatch, “Protecting Eden: Markets or Government?”, 
November 2002. 
0234  Anderson, Kym, “Agricultural Trade Reform and Poverty Reduction in Developing 
Countries”, November 2002. 
0233  Wood, Danielle and Kym Anderson, “What Determines the Future Value of an Icon 
Wine? Evidence from Australia”, November 2002. 
0232  Kym Anderson and Nielsen, Chantal, “Economic Effects of Agricultural Biotechnology 
Research in the Presence of Price-distorting Policies”. November 2002. 
0231  Jackson, Lee Ann, “Who Benefits from Quality Labelling? Segregation Costs, 
International Trade and Producer Outcomes”. November 2002. 
0230  Rajan, Ramkishen and Graham Bird, “Trade Liberalization and Poverty: Where Do We 
Stand?”, November 2002. 
0229  Rajaguru, Gulasekaran and Reza Siregar, “Sources of Variations Between the 
Inflation Rates of Korea, Thailand and Indonesia During the Post-1997 Crisis”, 
November 2002. 
0228  Barbier, Edward B, “Water and Economic Growth”, October 2002. 
0227  Barbier, Edward B, “The Role of Natural Resources in Economic Development”, 
October 2002. (The 49
th Joseph Fisher Lecture.) 
0226  Rajan, Ramkishen and Rahul Sen, “Liberalisation of Financial Services in Southeast 
Asia under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)”, October 2002. 
(Forthcoming in Journal of International Banking Law).  
0225  Anderson, Kym “Building an Internationally Competitive Australian Olive Industry: 
Lessons from the Wine Industry,” October 2002. (Since published in Australasian 
Agribusiness Perspectives, No. 56, December 2002.) 
0224  Bentzen, Jan, Søren Leth-Sørensen and Valdemar Smith, “Prices of French Icon 
Wines and the Business Cycle: Empirical Evidence from Danish Wine Auctions,” 
September 2002. 
0223  Bentzen, Jan and Valdemar Smith, “Wine Prices in the Nordic Countries: Are They 
Lower Than in the Region of Origin?” September 2002. 
0222  Rajan, Ramkishen and Graham Bird, ““Will Asian Economies Gain from Liberalizing 
Trade in Services?” September 2002. (Forthcoming in Journal of World Trade). 
0221  Siregar, Reza Y. and Gulasekaran Rajaguru, “Base Money and Exchange Rate: 
Sources of Inflation in Indonesia during the Post-1997 Financial Crisis” August 2002. 
0220  Rajan, Ramkishen, “International Financial Liberalisation in Developing Countries: 
Lessons from Recent Experiences” July 2002. (Since published in Economic and 
Political Weekly, 37 (29): 3017-21, July 20-26, 2002).   50
 